The Missing Chapter. Seapower and the Baltic Sea. Review of Admiral James Stravidis, USN (Ret.) (2017) Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans. New York: Penguin Press

Abstract

Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans is a book that everyone should read. The author, retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis, is well known beyond naval and maritime circles. Following a long and distinguished naval career, the pinnacle of which included serving as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO1, he was selected as the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a position he still holds today. It is apparent that Stavridis is passionate about the three interrelated disciplines that intersect throughout the work, which are captured in the title, and that have defined his extraordinary expertise as a naval historian, geopolitical strategist and, perhaps most importantly, sailor. The historical background discussed in each chapter leaves you yearning to learn more. The geopolitical implications and recommendations for the future of American seapower2 are well reasoned and insightful. By making the narrative personal in relaying his extensive professional experiences and deep involvement in the subject matter as a sailor and a senior operational leader and military diplomat, everything is tied together. Stavridis deftly deals with the oceans and four seas– the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian and Arctic and the Mediterranean, South China, Caribbean and “Outlaw”, respectively – each with their own chapter. From the outset, the interconnected nature of the one body of salt water that connects the economies of all nations is stressed – “the sea is one” (p. 2). He starts with the Pacific, the “mother of all oceans”. In this chapter, he highlights the historical and economic reasons why the U.S. Navy has, since the Second World War, had a majority of its forces in the Pacific. This is particularly true if you include the U.S. Navy’s presence in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Horn of Africa as connected to the broader Indo-Asia-Pacific region, a term that is now included in U.S. strategic documents.3 From the Eurocentric perspective, the second chapter on the Atlantic and the fourth chapter on the Mediterranean Sea highlight why a “pivot” or “rebalance” to the Pacific is not likely to change the U.S. Navy’s continued involvement in the first ocean and seas it sailed on its homeland’s front lawn. In addition