Is Little Red Riding Hood afraid of her grandmother? Cognitive vs. emotional response to a false belief

J. Bradmetz, R. Schneider
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引用次数: 76

Abstract

The essentials of a theory of mind are generally considered to be acquired around 4 years of age when the child succeeds in the standard ‘Maxi task’ (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, rational thought is not attained before 7-8 years of age in other domains of cognitive development. This study demonstrates that the mastery of mental state attribution using logical criteria is not reached before age 7-8 years when several assessments of a belief need to be coordinated. This is revealed by the dissociation between the cognitive and emotional assessments of a false belief which yield contradictory responses in most of the children who succeed on the standard task. The results were replicated in five experiments with a total of 254 children aged 3-8 years. The analysis of this decalage focuses on the autonomy of emotional attributions and the semi-mental and semi-behavioural structure of belief understanding implied in the standard task. An increase in processing capacity leads to a rational concept of belief around 7-8 years: this concept is called here ‘third-person', in opposition to ‘second-person’ which involves only an initial differentiation from the first-person point of view. Second-person depends on an opposition between the self and the other in terms of a single, modular evaluation of belief, whereas third-person depends on an integration among various assessments and provides a consistent and isotropic concept of belief.
小红帽害怕她的奶奶吗?对错误信念的认知反应和情感反应
心理理论的基本要素通常被认为是在4岁左右获得的,那时孩子成功完成了标准的“最大任务”(Wimmer & Perner, 1983)。然而,在其他认知发展领域,理性思维在7-8岁之前是无法实现的。本研究表明,在7-8岁之前,需要协调对信念的几种评估,才能掌握使用逻辑标准的心理状态归因。在大多数成功完成标准任务的孩子身上,对错误信念的认知和情感评估之间的分离产生了相互矛盾的反应,这揭示了这一点。这一结果在五个实验中得到了重复,共有254名3-8岁的儿童参与了实验。分析的重点是情绪归因的自主性和标准任务中隐含的信念理解的半心理和半行为结构。在7-8岁的时候,处理能力的增加会导致一个理性的信念概念:这个概念在这里被称为“第三人称”,与之相对的是“第二人称”,后者只涉及与第一人称观点的初步区别。第二人称依赖于自我和他人之间的对立,对信念进行单一的、模块化的评估,而第三人称依赖于各种评估之间的整合,并提供一致的、各向同性的信念概念。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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