Proliferation of Outsiders and Its Penalty: Transformation of the Governor Deployments in Russia and Its Effect on Electoral Mobilization, 1991-2019.

M. Torikai
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Abstract

As a result of a series of centralization reforms, initiated in 2000, a great number of studies have discussed that the center entrenched its control over regional subjects in Russia. Yet, several regional unrests observed in the recent years demonstrates an urgent need for an overhaul of the Russian center-periphery relationship, to which only limited attention has been paid yet. This study explains this instability by the increase of outsider governor deployments. Exploiting an original dataset of all governors from 1991 to 2019, patterns of outsider deployments and the effect of such deployments on the regional political processes are examined. Although President Boris Yel’tsin initially held the right to appoint and dismiss most governors in the first half of the 1990s, he did not try to dispatch outsider governors not firmly embedded in the regional societies. Whereas governors began to be elected through the popular gubernatorial elections in almost all of the regions since 1995, outsider candidates rarely won the posts of governors. In Vladimir Putin’s first and second terms (2000-2008), the power balance between the center and regions radically changed in favor of the center. In addition, scholars have argued that the center’s dominance over regional elites increased rapidly due to the de facto appointment system of governors was introduced in 2004. Nevertheless, even then, outsider governor deployments remained exceptional cases. Since the influence of United Russia as a dominant party was limited at that time, federal elites had to receive the endorsement of governors, as regional bosses, to secure the stability of the regime. However, after the triumph of United Russia in the 2007 parliamentary election and the advent of President Dmitrii Medvedev, the Presidential Administration embarked on active replacements of regional bosses with outsider governors loyal to the center. the
外来者的扩散及其惩罚:1991-2019年俄罗斯州长部署的转变及其对选举动员的影响
由于2000年开始的一系列中央集权改革,大量研究讨论了中央对俄罗斯地区主体的控制。然而,近年来观察到的几起地区动荡表明,迫切需要对俄罗斯与周边国家的关系进行彻底改革,而目前对这一关系的关注还很有限。这项研究通过增加外部管理者的部署来解释这种不稳定性。利用1991年至2019年所有州长的原始数据集,研究了外部部署的模式以及这种部署对区域政治进程的影响。虽然在上世纪90年代上半叶,叶利钦总统最初拥有任命和解聘大多数州长的权利,但他并没有试图派遣那些与地区社会关系不密切的外部州长。自1995年以来,几乎所有地区的州长都是通过民众选举产生的,而外部候选人很少赢得州长职位。在普京的第一个和第二个任期(2000-2008年),中央和地区之间的权力平衡发生了有利于中央的根本变化。此外,学者们认为,2004年引入的知事实任制使中央对地方精英的支配力迅速增强。然而,即便如此,外部行长的部署仍然是特例。由于当时统一俄罗斯党作为主导政党的影响力有限,联邦精英必须得到州长的认可,作为地区老板,以确保政权的稳定。然而,在统一俄罗斯党在2007年议会选举中获胜以及总统德米特里•梅德韦杰夫(Dmitrii Medvedev)上台后,总统行政部门开始用忠于中央的外部州长积极替换地方领导人。的
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