Italian Justice: An Opportunistic System

Abstract

The quality and efficiency of economic systems are extremely relevant for the growth of a country. This is particularly true in relation to the justice system. An efficient judicial system is important to ensure the execution of contracts and the protection of property rights [1]. Italy seems to be characterized by the congestion of the judicial system and by a considerable slowness [2]. The high level of Italian litigiousness could derive from a disproportionate dimension and lack of transparency in the regulatory framework, the mutability of legal parameters, and the large number of lawyers, all of which submerge the courts. There are five actors who are interested in the duration of litigation, i.e. the two parties, their lawyers and the judge. Three of them have an interest in prolonging the process, one (the judge) is a neutral spectator, and the plaintiff is the only one who would gain from concluding the process in as short a time as possible. The quality of this service, which elsewhere is marked by the rapidity of court - cases and procedures, is connected with the level of public resources necessary for managing this public service and the results obtained. In Italy the number of judges paid from public expenditure is in line with European levels. However, when compared to European systems, Italian justice is slower and less efficient. The aim of this work is to provide a picture of judicial efficiency in Italy, through the identification of some variables that affect the length of civil proceedings, particularly with regard to the role of lawyers. The analysis confirms a positive correlation between the number of lawyers and of civil procedures, showing a lawyers’ opportunistic behavior.