Comparison of Screening Devices

M. Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak, Frank Yang
{"title":"Comparison of Screening Devices","authors":"M. Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak, Frank Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4456198","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Public agencies are often tasked with allocating scarce resources (such as public housing or financial aid) to a target population. In many such cases, the goal is to maximize social welfare, which requires identifying agents who have the highest social value for the resource. The challenge is that while public agencies may be able to access some data about potential beneficiaries (for example, through means testing), they generally lack information necessary to achieve perfect targeting. When monetary transfers are unavailable or ineffective in targeting, public agencies often rely on \"ordeals\" instead. Natural examples include standing in line, filing out complicated forms, dealing with \"red tape,\" waiting, visiting an office at an inconvenient time, or traveling to a registration site. But what makes one costly screening device better than another?","PeriodicalId":210555,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4456198","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

Public agencies are often tasked with allocating scarce resources (such as public housing or financial aid) to a target population. In many such cases, the goal is to maximize social welfare, which requires identifying agents who have the highest social value for the resource. The challenge is that while public agencies may be able to access some data about potential beneficiaries (for example, through means testing), they generally lack information necessary to achieve perfect targeting. When monetary transfers are unavailable or ineffective in targeting, public agencies often rely on "ordeals" instead. Natural examples include standing in line, filing out complicated forms, dealing with "red tape," waiting, visiting an office at an inconvenient time, or traveling to a registration site. But what makes one costly screening device better than another?
筛选装置的比较
公共机构的任务通常是将稀缺资源(如公共住房或财政援助)分配给目标人群。在许多这样的情况下,目标是最大化社会福利,这需要确定对资源具有最高社会价值的代理人。挑战在于,虽然公共机构可能能够获得有关潜在受益人的一些数据(例如,通过经济状况调查),但它们通常缺乏实现完美目标所需的信息。当货币转移无法获得或无法确定目标时,公共机构往往依靠“考验”来代替。自然的例子包括排队,填写复杂的表格,处理“繁文缛节”,等待,在不方便的时间去办公室,或者去注册网站。但是,是什么让一种昂贵的筛查设备比另一种更好呢?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信