RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR OF 2008: REACTION OF UKRAINIAN POLITICUM

Abstract

The paper analyzes assessments of Ukraine's political environment regarding the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 – the military conflict between Georgia on the one hand and Russia and the separatist groups of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, the «hot» phase of which fell on August 8–12. It is stated that although Ukrainian and foreign historiographies already have some work on this military confrontation in the Caucasus, in all these cases it is mostly an analysis of the events of August 2008 in Georgia only through the prism of political history with a predominant chronology of the conflict. The main stages of the Russian-Georgian military confrontation in August 2008 and further attempts to resolve it through diplomacy are briefly outlined. It was stated that the «hot phase» of the confrontation on the territory of Georgia immediately became the center of attention of Ukrainian politicians. From the first day of the military conflict among Ukrainian political circles, there were two camps – pro-Georgian and pro-Russian – attitudes to which were correlated personal and collective political, ideological, mental, and even pragmatic sympathies, often turning from assessments of the foreign policy situation for disputes and discussions within the country. It is noted that the circles close to the then President Viktor Yushchenko took an openly pro-Georgian side, and the Ukrainian head of state himself visited Tbilisi against the background of the threat of Russian occupation in support of his counterpart Mikheil Saakashvili. It is stressed that the neutral attitude to military actions in the Caucasus prevailed among Ukrainian politicians, especially among Prime Ministers Yulia Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Lytvyn, who headed the bloc of the same name in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It is shown, that representatives of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine took a pro-Russian stance in assessing the military conflict, blaming official Tbilisi for the start of hostilities and supporting the idea of recognizing Russia’s independence after Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is concluded that despite the presence of such a diverse palette of views, it was not possible to adopt a clear consolidated official position within the walls of the parliament, despite the relevant appeals of Speaker Arsenii Yatseniuk. Keywords Russian Federation, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, war, politicum, Ukraine.