Basel revisited

Jie Min
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Abstract

The unprecedented growth and expansion of global trade and finance in the world today calls for a harmonized global rulemaking system more than ever to accommodate the increasingly intertwined economic ties among nations. However, critics often look at international lawmaking by “sub-national actors” and “regulatory networks of bureaucrats” with deep skepticism on the ground that it lacks accountability and legitimacy compared to lawmaking at the national level. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) serves as a counterexample. BCBS has been the foremost runner in promoting a harmonized global standard for banking regulation to remove systemic risk and strengthen the banking system. Despite perceived “democratic deficit” in such an international lawmaking process, BCBS has successfully developed three banking regulatory frameworks since the 1980s, which have been widely adopted worldwide, ranging from the most developed economies to countries with less sophisticated financial systems. This article aims to assess the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Basel Framework through a systematic account of the dynamics between states at the international level and within each state domestically during different stages of its development. Section 1 introduces the background of the international financial system in the 1970s, which served as the stimulus of the subsequent creation of the Basel Accord. Section 2 discusses the motivation behind the creation of BCBS in the early 1980s and presents paradoxical views on the interest alignment among participating states. Section 3 examines the formulation of the Basel Accord at the transnational level and the efforts that were made to enhance the legitimacy and accountability of this piece of soft law. Section 4 reviews the implementation of the rules at the national level through comparisons between the initial members of the framework and new participants, along with a look at non-member states that have also been strongly influenced by the Basel Framework.
巴塞尔协议重新审视
当今世界贸易和金融空前的增长和扩张,比以往任何时候都更需要一个协调一致的全球规则制定体系,以适应各国之间日益交织在一起的经济联系。然而,批评人士常常以深深的怀疑态度看待“次国家行为者”和“官僚监管网络”的国际立法,理由是与国家层面的立法相比,它缺乏问责性和合法性。巴塞尔银行监管委员会(BCBS)就是一个反例。BCBS一直是推动统一的全球银行监管标准以消除系统性风险和加强银行体系的先行者。尽管在这种国际立法过程中存在“民主赤字”,但自20世纪80年代以来,BCBS成功地制定了三个银行监管框架,这些框架已在世界范围内广泛采用,从最发达的经济体到金融体系不太成熟的国家。本文旨在通过系统地描述巴塞尔框架在国际层面上的国家之间以及每个国家在其发展的不同阶段的国内动态,来评估巴塞尔框架的合法性和有效性。第1节介绍了20世纪70年代国际金融体系的背景,这是后来巴塞尔协议诞生的刺激因素。第2节讨论了20世纪80年代初创建BCBS背后的动机,并就参与国之间的利益协调提出了矛盾的观点。第3节探讨了《巴塞尔协议》在跨国层面的制定,以及为加强这一软法律的合法性和问责制所作的努力。第4节通过比较框架的初始成员和新参与者,审查了国家一级规则的实施情况,同时考察了也受到巴塞尔框架强烈影响的非成员国。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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