Safe Collateral, Arm's-Length Credit: Evidence from the Commercial Real Estate Mortgage Market

Lamont K. Black, John Krainer, Joseph B. Nichols
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

When collateral is safe, there are less opportunities for things to go wrong. We examine matching between collateral and creditors in the commercial real estate mortgage market by comparing loans in commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) conduits and bank portfolios. We model CMBS financing as lower cost but less informed, such that only safe collateral is funded by CMBS. This prediction is tested using the 2007-2009 shutdown of the CMBS market as a natural experiment. The loans funded by banks that would have been securitized are less likely to default or be renegotiated, indicating that the securitization channel, when available, funds safe collateral.
安全抵押品,公平信用:来自商业房地产抵押贷款市场的证据
当抵押品是安全的,事情出错的机会就会减少。我们通过比较商业抵押贷款支持证券(CMBS)渠道和银行投资组合中的贷款来研究商业房地产抵押贷款市场中抵押品和债权人之间的匹配。我们将CMBS融资建模为成本较低但信息较少的模型,因此只有安全的抵押品才由CMBS提供。这一预测是用2007-2009年CMBS市场的关闭作为一个自然实验来检验的。本来会被证券化的银行贷款不太可能违约或重新谈判,这表明证券化渠道在可用时可以提供安全的抵押品。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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