Rescuing Logic Encryption in Post-SAT Era by Locking & Obfuscation

Amin Rezaei, Yuanqi Shen, H. Zhou
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

The active participation of external entities in the manufacturing flow has produced numerous hardware security issues in which piracy and overproduction are likely to be the most ubiquitous and expensive ones. The main approach to prevent unauthorized products from functioning is logic encryption that inserts key-controlled gates to the original circuit in a way that the valid behavior of the circuit only happens when the correct key is applied. The challenge for the security designer is to ensure neither the correct key nor the original circuit can be revealed by different analyses of the encrypted circuit. However, in state-of-the-art logic encryption works, a lot of performance is sold to guarantee security against powerful logic and structural attacks. This contradicts the primary reason of logic encryption that is to protect a precious design from being pirated and overproduced. In this paper, we propose a bilateral logic encryption platform that maintains high degree of security with small circuit modification. The robustness against exact and approximate attacks is also demonstrated.
通过锁定和混淆拯救后sat时代的逻辑加密
外部实体在制造流程中的积极参与产生了许多硬件安全问题,其中盗版和生产过剩可能是最普遍和最昂贵的问题。防止未经授权的产品运行的主要方法是逻辑加密,即在原始电路中插入密钥控制的门,使电路的有效行为仅在应用正确的密钥时发生。安全设计人员面临的挑战是确保正确的密钥和原始电路不会通过对加密电路的不同分析而被泄露。然而,在最先进的逻辑加密工作中,很多性能都是为了保证对强大的逻辑和结构攻击的安全性。这与逻辑加密的主要原因相矛盾,逻辑加密是为了保护宝贵的设计不被盗版和过度生产。在本文中,我们提出了一个双边逻辑加密平台,以保持高的安全性和小的电路修改。对精确攻击和近似攻击的鲁棒性也进行了验证。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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