The Impact of Unemployment Insurance Extensions on Disability Insurance Application and Allowance Rates

Matthew S. Rutledge
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引用次数: 40

Abstract

Both unemployment insurance (UI) extensions and the availability of disability benefits have disincentive effects on job search. But UI extensions can reduce the efficiency cost of disability benefits if UI recipients delay disability application until they exhaust their unemployment benefits. This paper, the first to focus on the effect of UI extensions on disability applications, investigates whether UI eligibility, extension, and exhaustion affect the timing of disability applications and the composition of the applicant pool. Jobless individuals are significantly less likely to apply to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) during UI extensions, and significantly more likely to apply when UI is ultimately exhausted. Healthier potential applicants appear more likely to delay, as state allowance rates increase after a new UI extension. Simulations find that a 13-week UI extension decreases SSDI and Medicare costs, offsetting about half of the increase in UI payments; this suggests that the benefits of UI extensions may be understated — permanent disability benefits are diverted to shorter-run unemployment benefits and, potentially, new jobs, while easing the burden on the nearly insolvent SSDI Trust Fund.
失业保险延长对伤残保险申请和津贴率的影响
失业保险(UI)的延长和残疾福利的可用性都对求职产生抑制作用。但是,如果失业救济金领取者推迟残疾申请,直到他们的失业救济金耗尽,那么失业救济金的延长可以降低残疾救济金的效率成本。本文首先关注UI扩展对残疾申请的影响,调查UI资格、扩展和用尽是否影响残疾申请的时间和申请人池的组成。失业人员在失业保险延长期间申请社会保障残疾保险(SSDI)的可能性明显降低,而在失业保险最终耗尽时申请的可能性明显增加。健康的潜在申请人似乎更有可能推迟,因为在新的失业保险延长后,国家津贴率会增加。模拟发现,13周的失业保险延期减少了SSDI和医疗保险成本,抵消了失业保险支付增加的一半左右;这表明,延长失业救济金的好处可能被低估了——永久性残疾救济金被转移到短期失业救济金上,并可能转移到新工作岗位上,同时减轻了几乎资不抵债的社会保障福利信托基金(SSDI Trust Fund)的负担。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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