Motivating Supplier Social Responsibility under Incomplete Visibility

Tim Kraft, León Valdés, Yanchong Zheng
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引用次数: 54

Abstract

Problem definition: We examine how a profit-driven firm (she) can motivate better social responsibility (SR) practices by a supplier (he) when these practices cannot be perfectly observed by the firm. We focus on the firm’s investment in the supplier’s SR capabilities. To capture the influence of consumer demands, we incorporate the potential for SR information to be disclosed by the firm or revealed by a third party. Academic/practical relevance: Most firms have limited visibility into the SR practices of their suppliers. However, there is little research on how a firm under incomplete visibility should (i) invest to improve a supplier’s SR practices and (ii) disclose SR information to consumers. We address this gap. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model with asymmetric information to study a supply chain with one supplier and one firm. The firm makes her investment decision given incomplete information about the supplier’s current SR practices. We analyze and compare two settings: the firm does not disclose versus she discloses SR information to the consumers. Results: The firm should invest a high (low) amount in the supplier’s capabilities if the information she observes suggests the supplier’s current SR practices are poor (good). She should always be more aggressive with her investment when disclosing (versus not disclosing). This more aggressive strategy ensures better supplier SR practices under disclosure. When choosing between disclosing and not disclosing, the firm most likely prefers not to disclose when the supplier’s current SR practices seem to be average. Managerial implications: (i) Greater visibility helps the firm to better tailor her investment to the level of support needed. (ii) Better visibility also makes the firm more “truthful” in her disclosure, whereas increased third-party scrutiny makes her more “cautious.” (iii) Mandating disclosure is most beneficial for SR when the suppliers’ current practices seem to be average.
不完全可见下的供应商社会责任激励
问题定义:我们研究一个利润驱动的公司(她)如何在供应商(他)不能完全遵守这些实践的情况下,激励供应商(他)更好地履行社会责任(SR)。我们关注公司对供应商SR能力的投资。为了捕捉消费者需求的影响,我们考虑了企业或第三方披露SR信息的可能性。学术/实践相关性:大多数公司对其供应商的社会责任实践的可见性有限。然而,很少有研究表明,在不完全可见的情况下,企业应该(i)投资改善供应商的社会责任实践,(ii)向消费者披露社会责任信息。我们解决了这一差距。方法:建立了一个信息不对称的博弈论模型来研究只有一个供应商和一个企业的供应链。公司在供应商当前SR实践信息不完整的情况下做出投资决策。我们分析和比较了两种情况:公司不向消费者披露SR信息与她向消费者披露SR信息。结果:如果她观察到的信息表明供应商当前的SR实践是差的(好的),公司应该在供应商的能力上投入高(低)的金额。在披露(相对于不披露)时,她应该更积极地对待自己的投资。这种更积极的策略确保了供应商在信息披露下更好的社会责任实践。当在披露和不披露之间做出选择时,当供应商目前的社会责任实践看起来一般时,公司最有可能不愿意披露。管理影响:(i)更大的知名度有助于公司更好地根据所需的支持水平调整其投资。(ii)更好的能见度也使公司在信息披露上更加“真实”,而第三方审查的增加则使她更加“谨慎”。“(iii)当供应商目前的做法似乎一般时,强制披露对SR最有利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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