{"title":"The Personal and the Political: Implications of Constitutional Entrepreneurship","authors":"A. Salter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2705828","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper makes a simple but underappreciated point: due to the open-ended nature of constitutional entrepreneurship, the personal characteristics of constitutional entrepreneurs — intellect, will, virtues and vices, etc. — directly bear on constitutional change. The paper demonstrates this at a theoretical level by (a) highlighting how the environment in which constitutional entrepreneurship takes place leaves room for constitutional entrepreneurs’ personal traits to affect political-economic outcomes, and (b) exploring the nature of constitutional entrepreneurship in itself. The argument implies the study of sociopolitical institutions’ information- and incentive-aligning features must be augmented by analyses of institutions’ ‘moral filters.’ The paper concludes by outlining a personalist approach to political economy, implicit in several seemingly-unrelated literatures.","PeriodicalId":369466,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2705828","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
This paper makes a simple but underappreciated point: due to the open-ended nature of constitutional entrepreneurship, the personal characteristics of constitutional entrepreneurs — intellect, will, virtues and vices, etc. — directly bear on constitutional change. The paper demonstrates this at a theoretical level by (a) highlighting how the environment in which constitutional entrepreneurship takes place leaves room for constitutional entrepreneurs’ personal traits to affect political-economic outcomes, and (b) exploring the nature of constitutional entrepreneurship in itself. The argument implies the study of sociopolitical institutions’ information- and incentive-aligning features must be augmented by analyses of institutions’ ‘moral filters.’ The paper concludes by outlining a personalist approach to political economy, implicit in several seemingly-unrelated literatures.