{"title":"Non-interactive Secure and Privacy Preserving Protocol for Inter-vehicle Communication Networks","authors":"Fatty M. Salem, M. Ibrahim, I. I. Ibrahim","doi":"10.1109/ITNG.2010.69","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we introduce a non-interactive secure protocol preserving privacy of the drivers for Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) networks. To protect the privacy among drivers, we propose to arrange vehicles into several groups. Vehicles in a group share the same public key, but each member can change his own set of public keys frequently, so the receiving vehicle cannot identify an individual driver in the group. In addition, each member has a private key provided by the Third Trusted Party (TTP) to enable the TTP, who is assumed to be fully trusted, to trace the driver who sends malicious information. Then, the TTP computes a fixed token of all members in the same group, but only participants in IVC networks can convince the receiving vehicle that the token is corresponding to their changed public keys set. So, we can achieve authentication.","PeriodicalId":379699,"journal":{"name":"2010 Seventh International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2010 Seventh International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ITNG.2010.69","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a non-interactive secure protocol preserving privacy of the drivers for Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) networks. To protect the privacy among drivers, we propose to arrange vehicles into several groups. Vehicles in a group share the same public key, but each member can change his own set of public keys frequently, so the receiving vehicle cannot identify an individual driver in the group. In addition, each member has a private key provided by the Third Trusted Party (TTP) to enable the TTP, who is assumed to be fully trusted, to trace the driver who sends malicious information. Then, the TTP computes a fixed token of all members in the same group, but only participants in IVC networks can convince the receiving vehicle that the token is corresponding to their changed public keys set. So, we can achieve authentication.