Competitive Intervention and the Angolan Civil War, 1975–1991

Abstract

This chapter examines external intervention in the Angolan civil war between 1975 and 1991. I argue that while “winning” was undoubtedly the primary objective for the Angolan government led by the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and for its rebel challengers in Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), fears of uncontrolled escalation led competitive interveners – on one side, Cuba and the USSR, and on the other, South Africa and the US – to constrain the form and scope of their interventions. Strategic restraint was manifest in distinctions between advisory and combat missions, geographic areas of operation, adopted force postures, and target selection. In effect, the need to avoid uncontrolled escalation generated a set of interventions on the part of South Africa and the US that aimed to sustain the rebel insurgency rather than propel it to victory, and a corresponding set of interventions on the part of Cuba and the USSR that aimed to prevent the dislodging of the Angolan government rather than end the civil war. This resulted in a decades-long conflict that inflicted hundreds of thousands of deaths, displaced millions, and decimated economic and political institutions across the country.