Monetary Policy and Liquid Government Debt

D. Andolfatto, F. Martin
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引用次数: 16

Abstract

Abstract We examine the conduct of monetary policy in a world where the supply of outside money is controlled by the fiscal authority–a scenario increasingly relevant for many developed economies today. Central bank control over the long-run inflation rate depends on whether fiscal policy is Ricardian or Non-Ricardian. The optimal monetary policy follows a generalized Friedman rule that eliminates the liquidity premium on scarce treasury debt. We derive conditions for determinacy under both fiscal regimes and show that they do not necessarily correspond to the Taylor principle. In addition, Non-Ricardian regimes may suffer from multiplicity of steady-states when the government runs persistent deficits.
货币政策与流动政府债务
摘要:我们研究在外部货币供应由财政当局控制的世界中货币政策的行为,这种情况与当今许多发达经济体越来越相关。央行对长期通胀率的控制取决于财政政策是李嘉图还是非李嘉图。最优货币政策遵循广义的弗里德曼规则,即消除稀缺国债的流动性溢价。我们推导了两种财政制度下的确定性条件,并表明它们不一定符合泰勒原则。此外,当政府持续赤字时,非李嘉图政体可能会遭受多重稳态的困扰。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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