Safety assessment of severe accident mitigating system “Passive Residual Heat Removal System of secondary side” in K-2/K-3 NPP

Muhammad Abu Bakar, M. S. Sarwar
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Abstract

The presented analysis carried out for the safety assessment of the Passive Residual Heat Removal System of secondary side (PRS), one of the Severe Accident Mitigating System of K-2/K-3 Nuclear power plants. Preliminary analysis of the PRS is carried out using computer code MELCOR, which is a thermal hydraulic code that models the progression of severe accidents in light water nuclear power plants. The system was analyzed under SBO without the main feed-water, auxiliary feed-water and the safety injection systems. The system is activated after the SBO and failure of auxiliary feed-water pumps and the turbine driven pumps by opening the isolation valves and closing the main steam isolation valve to avoid the steam loss. Three trains of PRS are modeled and connected with secondary side of each Steam Generators along with a make-up tank, each trains is connected with the same cooling tower (Heat Sink). The system can maintain the reactor in safe condition for 72 hours, if it is actuated before the large loss of primary coolant inventory or fuel damage in the core. The three independent trains for each steam generator are consider for heat removal of secondary side. If one of the train is considered unavailable that will lead to fuel failure and RPV failure within 72 hours. Although the failure time increases in comparison to the SBO without the PRS. The reactor remains in safe conditions if the PRS system operate at or above 80% of its design thermal load removing capability. The safety assessment was made with and without using this severe accident countermeasure introduced in K-2/K-3 NPP.
K-2/K-3核电站严重事故缓解系统“二次侧被动余热排出系统”的安全性评价
本文针对K-2/K-3核电站严重事故缓解系统之一的二次侧被动余热排出系统(PRS)进行了安全评价分析。使用计算机代码MELCOR对PRS进行了初步分析,MELCOR是一个模拟轻水核电站严重事故进展的热工水力代码。在无主给水、辅助给水和安全喷射系统的情况下,对该系统进行了SBO分析。当辅助给水泵和水轮驱动泵发生SBO和故障后,通过打开隔离阀和关闭主蒸汽隔离阀来激活系统,以避免蒸汽损失。模拟了三列PRS,并将其与每个蒸汽发生器的二次侧连接,并与一个补给罐连接,每列列车与同一个冷却塔(散热器)连接。如果在一次冷却剂库存大量流失或堆芯燃料损坏之前启动该系统,该系统可以使反应堆在安全状态下运行72小时。考虑每台蒸汽发生器的三列独立列车进行二次侧排热。如果其中一列火车被认为不可用,将导致72小时内燃料故障和RPV故障。尽管与没有PRS的SBO相比,故障时间增加了。如果PRS系统运行在其设计热负荷去除能力的80%或以上,反应堆仍处于安全状态。分别对K-2/K-3核电站采用和不采用该严重事故对策进行了安全评价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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