Implementing the “Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model” as a Bargaining Solution Analysis for Local Government Decision from Territory-Community to “Behavioral” Community

Abstract

Local development as a process of local management raises a variety of issues, most notably conflict resolution between the three power local poles: (1) the state and its nominated State periphery Departments; (2) local authorities; and (3) local people and their local movements/lobbies. Because the three poles are always negotiating, each of them should win out over the other two, resulting in the bargaining dilemma being introduced. As a result, it's necessary to define bargaining conduct. The proposed “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” (derived from Nash win-win extended approach) aims to find ways for the three-pole bargaining conceptual equilibrium, under conditions,thus maximizing expected utilities for all the involved parts in local decision-making by the use of a combination of Descriptive Behavior (DB), Rational Choice, Instrumental Rationality, and the Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) methodologies, then an updating community’s behavioral state is expected, thus transforming the technical territory-community perception to a behavioral community perception, by sensitizing its population, towards the “guanxi relations” paradigm. Sensitization process should be concerned as a continuous process toward the limit of the absolute cooperation between local people in the community. On that case, the limit of the sensitization process coincides with the limit of the local development process and the limit of bargaining power pole convergence.