Hybrid warfare on the Ukrainian battlefield: developing theory based on empirical evidence

Johann C. Schmid
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Abstract With the takeover of Crimea by masked Russian soldiers/fighters without national insignia in February/March 2014, with the Kremlin at first denying its involvement, war became ‘hybrid’ in our minds. The follow-on conflict in Eastern Ukraine, with separatism supported by neighbouring countries and the armed establishment and military securing of pseudo-state people’s republics, including recourse to pro-Russian fighters ‘on holiday’, has reinforced the impression of a hybrid form of warfare, raising the question: what is hybrid warfare? This article argues that the specific nature of hybrid warfare is essentially a strategic matter characterised by three key tendencies and their orchestration within a hybrid ‘grand strategy’: 1. Focusing the decision of the war/conflict, as such, primarily on a broad spectrum of non-military centres of gravity in a flexible and dynamic manner. 2. Operating in the shadow of various interfaces against specific vulnerabilities of the opponent, thus challenging traditional lines of order and responsibilities, creating ambiguity and paralysing the decision-making process of the opponent. 3. Creative combination and parallel use of different civilian and military means and methods, categories and forms of warfare and fighting, thus creating ‘new’ mixed, hybrid forms.1 At the same time, there is a growing sense that hybrid forms of warfare will shape the face of war in the 21st century.2 They seem to offer unpretentious political success by smart recourse to limited, deniable and supposedly manageable use of force. The assumption that the risk of military escalation and political damage could be kept within limits may at the same time increase the likelihood of the offensive use of hybrid forms of warfare. For this reason, it is high time to improve our common and comprehensive understanding of hybrid forms of warfare as a precondition for common and comprehensive action in defence and response.
乌克兰战场上的混合战争:基于经验证据的发展理论
2014年2月至3月,没有国家徽章的蒙面俄罗斯士兵/武装分子占领了克里米亚,克里姆林宫起初否认参与其中,战争在我们的脑海中变成了“混合”战争。随后在乌克兰东部发生的冲突中,分裂主义得到了邻国的支持,武装机构和伪国家人民共和国的军事保障,包括求助于“度假”的亲俄战士,强化了一种混合形式的战争的印象,提出了一个问题:什么是混合战争?本文认为,混合战争的具体性质本质上是一个战略问题,其特征是三个关键趋势及其在混合“大战略”中的协调:以灵活和动态的方式将战争/冲突的决定主要集中在广泛的非军事重心上。2. 在针对对手特定弱点的各种界面的阴影下操作,从而挑战传统的秩序和责任线,制造模糊性并瘫痪对手的决策过程。3.创造性地结合和平行使用不同的民用和军事手段和方法,类别和形式的战争和战斗,从而创造“新的”混合,混合形式与此同时,人们越来越意识到,混合形式的战争将塑造21世纪战争的面貌他们似乎通过明智地求助于有限的、可否认的、据称可控的武力使用,提供了朴实的政治成功。军事升级和政治破坏的风险可以控制在一定范围内的假设,同时可能会增加进攻性使用混合战争形式的可能性。因此,现在是提高我们对混合战争形式的共同和全面理解的时候了,这是在防御和反应方面采取共同和全面行动的先决条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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