4E Cognition

A. Newen, S. Gallagher, L. D. De Bruin
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引用次数: 15

Abstract

The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer presuppose a common understanding of X being constitutive for P as X being necessary in all possible worlds for P. This metaphysical understanding is increasingly challenged. We also clarify that the question about the role of mental representations needs an independent answer from the question about the role of the 4E features. After a short outline of the central concepts, we present an overview of the nine sections and outline their importance for the debate concerning the role of 4E features in thinking about the mind.
4 e认知
引言首先提供了4E核心特征的定义,即具体的、嵌入的、制定的和扩展的认知特征。为了搭建舞台,我们概述了这些特征所扮演角色的概念区别:它们只是因果地影响一种心理现象,还是其中一些构成了这种心理现象?我们认为,我们不能再假定X是P的组成部分,即X在P的所有可能世界中都是必要的。这种形而上学的理解正日益受到挑战。我们还澄清了关于心理表征的作用的问题需要从关于4E特征的作用的问题中得到一个独立的答案。在对中心概念进行简要概述之后,我们将对这九个部分进行概述,并概述它们对于关于4E特征在思维中的作用的辩论的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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