Summation of the debate on the feasibility of a phenomenological theory of justice

Abstract

Murray (2003a, in this issue) addresses some of the points raised by Makridis (2003) in response to Murray's earlier article entitled "The dialogical prioritization of calls: Toward a communicative model of justice" (Murray, 2003b). If anyone is eminently qualified to argue the case for a Levinasianphenomenological theory of justice, it must be he. Murray has deep knowledge of Levinas' phenomenology and is conversant both with the primary sources and with the growing bibliography on Levinas' work. My continuing reservations about the prospects of developing a Levinasian theory of justice should not, therefore, be taken to reflect on Murray's acumen or competence. If anything, it is fair to say that if Murray is stymied in his efforts, this is already a telling sign that a phenomenological theory of justice may be unobtainable. The deeper theoretical significance of this would be that, as many a prophet of post-modernism has gloated or lamented, one does indeed reach the dead end for normativity with the development of certain characteristically modern trends. One cannot have it both ways. Ivan Karazamov's grim aside (either there is a God, or everything is permitted) may sound at first like a false dichotomy but its inner core, which makes this utterance so effective, fulfils a curiously stringent methodological requirement: Unless preference-transcendent criteria are available to the moral agent (either on natural foundations or as rational decision making procedures) ethical demands cannot be defended. Phenomenology rejects objectivist claims; it also rejects theory-laden rationalisms of all kinds. What is left, then, to furnish phenomenology with normative grounds? How can phenomenology produce a normative theory of any kind? It is to Murray's credit that he has undertaken so difficult, as it is high-stakes, a task as to convince us that a phenomenological theory of justice (*1) is feasible. Levinasian phenomenology is radically opposed to theory. In fact, this stern opposition to theory, which it dismisses as a totalizing and intrinsically hegemonic expropriation of human spontaneity, has a moral pathos to it. Far from serving as a possible foundation for a normative theory, however, this pathos is consistently anti-foundationalist: it equally resists, or ought to resist, its own