The Impact of Information Sharing on the Use of Collateral versus Guarantees

ERN: Search Pub Date : 2017-01-02 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2834038
R. de Haas, Matteo Millone
{"title":"The Impact of Information Sharing on the Use of Collateral versus Guarantees","authors":"R. de Haas, Matteo Millone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2834038","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This study exploits contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new credit registry on the use of borrower collateral versus third-party guarantees. Among first-time borrowers, the introduction of mandatory information sharing leads to a shift from collateral to guarantees, in particular for riskier borrowers. Among repeat borrowers, both collateral and guarantee requirements decline in proportion to the length of the lending relationship. These results suggest that information sharing can both reduce adverse selection among new borrowers and hold-up problems among repeat borrowers.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"176 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Search","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834038","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5

Abstract

This study exploits contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new credit registry on the use of borrower collateral versus third-party guarantees. Among first-time borrowers, the introduction of mandatory information sharing leads to a shift from collateral to guarantees, in particular for riskier borrowers. Among repeat borrowers, both collateral and guarantee requirements decline in proportion to the length of the lending relationship. These results suggest that information sharing can both reduce adverse selection among new borrowers and hold-up problems among repeat borrowers.
信息共享对抵押品与担保使用的影响
本研究利用来自波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的合同层面的数据来评估新的信用登记对使用借款人抵押品和第三方担保的影响。在首次借款人中,强制性信息共享的引入导致了从抵押品到担保的转变,尤其是对风险较高的借款人。在重复借款人中,抵押品和担保要求与贷款关系的长度成比例地下降。这些结果表明,信息共享既可以减少新借款人之间的逆向选择,也可以减少重复借款人之间的拖延问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信