Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works

Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal Pub Date : 2018-05-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2930520

J. Gans-Morse, Mariana Borges, Alexey Makarin, Theresa Mannah Blankson, Andre Nickow, Dong Zhang

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引用次数: 90

Abstract

Abstract This article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti-corruption policies, with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants. Drawing on the work of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, we examine seven policy categories: (1) rewards and penalties; (2) monitoring; (3) restructuring bureaucracies; (4) screening and recruiting; (5) anti-corruption agencies; (6) educational campaigns; and (7) international agreements. Notably, rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti-corruption policies. Nevertheless, we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring, including anti-corruption audits and e-governance. In addition, adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption. An emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature. We conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review, such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem, it cannot be treated in the long term with individual-level solutions.

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减少官僚腐败:如何有效的跨学科视角

本文首次全面回顾了有关反腐败政策的跨学科知识状况，特别关注减少公务员腐败。借鉴经济学家、政治学家、社会学家和人类学家的工作，我们研究了七个政策类别:(1)奖励和惩罚;(2)监测;(3)重组官僚机构;(四)筛选招聘;(五)反腐败机构;(六)教育活动;(7)国际协定。值得注意的是，大多数普遍规定的反腐败政策缺乏严格的实证评估。然而，我们发现越来越多的证据表明，基于监督的政策(包括反腐败审计和电子政务)是有效的。此外，适当的公务员工资似乎是控制贪污的必要但不充分的条件。对反腐机构有效性的怀疑在文献中也很明显。最后，我们总结了从审查中得出的更广泛的经验教训，例如认识到，当腐败是一个系统性问题时，从长远来看，无法通过个人层面的解决方案来解决。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal

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