{"title":"A Promised Value Approach to Optimal Monetary Policy","authors":"Timothy S. Hills, Taisuke Nakata, Takeki Sunakawa","doi":"10.17016/FEDS.2018.083","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes optimal commitment policy in the New Keynesian model using a recursive formulation of the central bank's in finite horizon optimization problem in which promised inflation and output gap - as opposed to lagged Lagrange multipliers - act as pseudo-state variables. Our recursive formulation is motivated by Kydland and Prescott (1980). Using three well known variants of the model - one featuring inflation bias, one featuring stabilization bias, and one featuring a lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates - we show that the proposed formulation sheds new light on the nature of the intertemporal trade-off facing the central bank.","PeriodicalId":153113,"journal":{"name":"Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Research Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Research Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2018.083","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
This paper characterizes optimal commitment policy in the New Keynesian model using a recursive formulation of the central bank's in finite horizon optimization problem in which promised inflation and output gap - as opposed to lagged Lagrange multipliers - act as pseudo-state variables. Our recursive formulation is motivated by Kydland and Prescott (1980). Using three well known variants of the model - one featuring inflation bias, one featuring stabilization bias, and one featuring a lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates - we show that the proposed formulation sheds new light on the nature of the intertemporal trade-off facing the central bank.