Arms and Diplomacy

Arbatov Alexey
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019 threatens to dismantle the entire nuclear arms control system built over the last 50 years. It may lead to an uncontrolled multilateral arms race involving strategic, intermediate-range, tactical nuclear and non-nuclear offensive and defensive weapons. This dangerous turn of events is met with different attitude by different politicians and experts. One expanding school of thought postulates that the bipolar world of the Cold War era has given way to multipolarity, so bilateral nuclear weapons restrictions are no longer feasible. This assumption is supplemented by a hypothesis that it is impossible to control the newest weapons and military technologies using previous methods of negotiations and agreements, so those methods should also be abandoned. The focus should allegedly shift to various multilateral forums on creating an environment for nuclear disarmament and enhancing nuclear deterrence, transparency and predictability. Thus, the main premise is that the current arms control crisis is unavoidable and does not pose much danger: it is possible to do without formal nuclear arms reduction, limitation and non-proliferation agreements. However, scientific analysis demonstrates that the above assumptions about the advent of nuclear multipolarity and effects of new technologies are wrong. Firstly, despite deep reductions in nuclear weapons over the last 30 years, the proportion of those controlled by the two leading nuclear powers has barely declined at all, and the nuclear landscape remains largely bilateral. Secondly, the revolutionary impact of military technological progress is not something new, but is a logical phenomenon that has occurred regularly throughout history. Nonetheless, five decades of experience clearly demonstrated that arms control can be very successful, provided there is political will at the highest governments’ level to reach agreements on limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. Like in the past, in the foreseeable future, arms control measures are able to substantially reduce the threat posed by innovative weapons systems. No doubt, arms control agreements do have their limits. But overall, despite certain gaps and failures, the arms control process has scored a number of historical victories during the past 50 years, and it should remain at the core of international security, even if many problems cannot be resolved quickly or all at once. Only the continuation of nuclear arms control can create political and military conditions for eventual limitations of many innovative weapons systems and technologies, as well as for a phased shift to a multilateral format of nuclear disarmament.
武器与外交
美国将于2019年退出《中导条约》,这可能会摧毁过去50年来建立的整个核军备控制体系。它可能导致不受控制的多边军备竞赛,涉及战略、中程、战术核武器和非核进攻性和防御性武器。不同的政治家和专家对这种危险的事态发展持不同的态度。一个不断扩大的思想流派认为,冷战时期的两极世界已经让位于多极化,因此双边核武器限制不再可行。这一假设还补充了一个假设,即使用以前的谈判和协定方法不可能控制最新的武器和军事技术,因此也应放弃这些方法。据称,重点应转移到有关创造核裁军环境和加强核威慑、透明度和可预测性的各种多边论坛。因此,主要的前提是,目前的军备控制危机是不可避免的,不会造成太大的危险:没有正式的削减、限制和不扩散核武器的协定是可以做到的。然而,科学分析表明,上述关于核多极化的出现和新技术影响的假设是错误的。首先,尽管在过去30年里核武器大幅削减,但两个主要核大国控制的核武器比例几乎没有下降,核格局基本上仍然是双边的。其次,军事技术进步的革命性影响并不是什么新鲜事,而是历史上经常发生的一种逻辑现象。然而,五十年的经验清楚地表明,只要最高政府一级有政治意愿就限制和裁减核武器达成协议,军备控制就可以非常成功。与过去一样,在可预见的未来,军备控制措施能够大大减少创新武器系统构成的威胁。毫无疑问,军备控制协议确实有其局限性。但总的来说,尽管存在一些差距和失败,军备控制进程在过去50年中取得了一些历史性胜利,即使许多问题无法迅速或一下子得到解决,它仍应是国际安全的核心。只有继续实行核军备控制,才能创造政治和军事条件,最终限制许多创新的武器系统和技术,并逐步转向核裁军的多边形式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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