A Game of Incentives: An Efficient Demand Response Mechanism using Fleet of Electric Vehicles

Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Future Industrial Communication Networks Pub Date : 2018-10-01 DOI:10.1145/3243318.3243322

K. Kaur, S. Garg, Neeraj Kumar, Albert Y. Zomaya

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引用次数: 9

Abstract

With the explosive penetration of Electric Vehicles (EVs) in the last decade, the load on the existing grids have exaggerated manifold. This has led to severe demand-supply imbalances causing grid instability and reliability issues. Towards this end, Demand Reponse (DR) management has been identified as an important means to tackle this problem. Thus, in this paper, a robust Stackelberg Game has been proposed wherein the Utility Provider (UP) and fleet of EVs are assumed to be playing the roles of a competitive leader and followers, respectively. In the considered game, EVs charging problem has been formulated as a non-cooperative game; in which EVs decide their charging slot in accordance with the real-time electricity prices announced by the UP. The existence and uniqueness of the formulated Stackelberg Game has been theoretically proved in the paper. Further, the efficacy of the formulated game has been validated on real-time data traces obtained from Haryana State Electricity Board, India.

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激励博弈:基于电动车队的有效需求响应机制

近十年来，随着电动汽车的迅猛发展，现有电网的负荷成倍增加。这导致了严重的供需失衡，导致电网不稳定和可靠性问题。为此，需求响应(DR)管理已被确定为解决这一问题的重要手段。因此，本文提出了一个稳健的Stackelberg博弈，其中假设公用事业提供商(UP)和电动汽车车队分别扮演竞争性领导者和追随者的角色。在考虑的博弈中，电动汽车充电问题被表述为一个非合作博弈;其中，电动汽车根据UP公布的实时电价决定充电时段。本文从理论上证明了公式化的Stackelberg对策的存在唯一性。此外，制定的游戏的功效已在印度哈里亚纳邦电力局获得的实时数据痕迹上得到验证。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Future Industrial Communication Networks

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