{"title":"The New Insider Trading","authors":"Karen E. Woody","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3474570","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Pursuant to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, in order to obtain a conviction for insider trading based upon a tipper-tippee theory, the government must prove that the tipper received a personal benefit for the tip, and that the tippee knew about that benefit. The last five years of blockbuster insider trading cases have focused on this seemingly nebulous personal benefit test, and the Supreme Court has been unable to clear the muddy waters. As a result, the parameters of insider trading remain hard to pin down, and often shift depending on the facts of the most recent case. Two terms ago, the Supreme Court, in an unsurprising unanimous decision in Salman v. United States, reaffirmed the holding of Dirks, from which the personal benefit test arose. The Court in Salman, however, failed to elucidate the more problematic areas of insider trading, including the application of the personal benefit test if the tippee is not a trading relative or friend. Legal practitioners, legislators, and academics have offered up various solutions for the problem of having an amorphous law against insider trading, yet none have succeeded. \n \nThis Article suggests that the hubbub over defining the personal benefit element of insider trading — sure to reach a fever pitch the next time a cert petition on the issue is granted — may be misguided. This is because there may be a simpler way to bring an insider trading case. Since Sarbanes-Oxley, there has been a sleepy provision of the criminal code that could present an end-around to the morass of insider trading precedents under Rule 10b-5. Under 18 U.S.C. §1348, the government can bring an insider trading case under the more general umbrella of securities fraud, which has scant jurisprudential precedent. In other words, the heavily-litigated personal benefit test found in Dirks may not apply to a charge of insider trading under §1348. The elements required to prove a charge under §1348 are similar to other fraud-based offenses such as mail and wire fraud, health care fraud, and bank fraud. Whether §1348 was intended to apply to insider trading in particular is an open question, and a broader question is whether the jurisprudential interpretation for the elements of the crime of insider trading as defined under Rule 10b-5 should be imported into the judicial interpretation of § 1348. In other words, if the conduct that constitutes criminal insider trading under Rule 10b-5 exists only if the elements of the Dirks test are met, then a §1348 charge for criminal insider trading may create an entirely new scheme and definition of the crime. This Article analyzes the potential of this dual paradigm, and argues that, given the uncertainty and shifting parameters of insider trading prohibitions, application of §1348 to insider trading should be afforded the rule of lenity.","PeriodicalId":383610,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Crime","volume":"369 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Society: Public Law - Crime","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3474570","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
Pursuant to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, in order to obtain a conviction for insider trading based upon a tipper-tippee theory, the government must prove that the tipper received a personal benefit for the tip, and that the tippee knew about that benefit. The last five years of blockbuster insider trading cases have focused on this seemingly nebulous personal benefit test, and the Supreme Court has been unable to clear the muddy waters. As a result, the parameters of insider trading remain hard to pin down, and often shift depending on the facts of the most recent case. Two terms ago, the Supreme Court, in an unsurprising unanimous decision in Salman v. United States, reaffirmed the holding of Dirks, from which the personal benefit test arose. The Court in Salman, however, failed to elucidate the more problematic areas of insider trading, including the application of the personal benefit test if the tippee is not a trading relative or friend. Legal practitioners, legislators, and academics have offered up various solutions for the problem of having an amorphous law against insider trading, yet none have succeeded.
This Article suggests that the hubbub over defining the personal benefit element of insider trading — sure to reach a fever pitch the next time a cert petition on the issue is granted — may be misguided. This is because there may be a simpler way to bring an insider trading case. Since Sarbanes-Oxley, there has been a sleepy provision of the criminal code that could present an end-around to the morass of insider trading precedents under Rule 10b-5. Under 18 U.S.C. §1348, the government can bring an insider trading case under the more general umbrella of securities fraud, which has scant jurisprudential precedent. In other words, the heavily-litigated personal benefit test found in Dirks may not apply to a charge of insider trading under §1348. The elements required to prove a charge under §1348 are similar to other fraud-based offenses such as mail and wire fraud, health care fraud, and bank fraud. Whether §1348 was intended to apply to insider trading in particular is an open question, and a broader question is whether the jurisprudential interpretation for the elements of the crime of insider trading as defined under Rule 10b-5 should be imported into the judicial interpretation of § 1348. In other words, if the conduct that constitutes criminal insider trading under Rule 10b-5 exists only if the elements of the Dirks test are met, then a §1348 charge for criminal insider trading may create an entirely new scheme and definition of the crime. This Article analyzes the potential of this dual paradigm, and argues that, given the uncertainty and shifting parameters of insider trading prohibitions, application of §1348 to insider trading should be afforded the rule of lenity.
根据美国证券交易委员会第10b-5条规则,为了根据内幕交易理论获得内幕交易的定罪,政府必须证明举报人因提供线索而获得了个人利益,并且举报人知道这一利益。过去五年的内幕交易重磅案件都集中在这个看似模糊的个人利益测试上,而最高法院一直无法清除这片浑水。因此,内幕交易的参数仍然难以确定,并且经常根据最新案件的事实而变化。两个任期前,最高法院在萨勒曼诉美国案(Salman v. United States)中不出所料地一致作出裁决,重申了德克斯案的判决,个人利益测试由此产生。然而,法院在萨勒曼案中未能阐明内幕交易中更有问题的领域,包括在举报人不是交易亲戚或朋友的情况下适用个人利益测试。法律从业者、立法者和学者们提出了各种各样的解决方案,以解决反对内幕交易的无定形法律的问题,但没有一个成功。本文认为,界定内幕交易的个人利益因素所引发的喧嚣可能是被误导的——下次有关该问题的认证申请获得批准时,肯定会达到狂热的程度。这是因为可能有一种更简单的方式来提起内幕交易诉讼。自《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley)出台以来,刑法中一直有一项沉闷的条款,可能会终结规则10b-5规定的内幕交易先例的泥沼。18岁以下事项§1348年,政府能带来一个更一般的伞下的内幕交易案证券欺诈、缺乏法理的先例。换句话说,在德克斯案中发现的备受争议的个人利益测试可能不适用于第1348条下的内幕交易指控。根据§1348证明指控所需的要素与其他基于欺诈的犯罪类似,如邮件和电信欺诈、医疗保健欺诈和银行欺诈。第1348条是否特别适用于内幕交易是一个悬而未决的问题,而一个更广泛的问题是,规则10b-5对内幕交易犯罪要素的法理解释是否应该引入第1348条的司法解释。换句话说,如果根据10b-5规则构成刑事内幕交易的行为只有在满足德克斯测试的要素时才存在,那么第1348条对刑事内幕交易的指控可能会创造一个全新的方案和犯罪定义。本文分析了这种双重范式的潜力,并认为,鉴于内幕交易禁令的不确定性和变化参数,第1348条对内幕交易的适用应给予宽大处理规则。