Meizhi Wang, Sirish Oruganti, Shanshan Xie, Raghavan Kumar, S. Mathew, J. Kulkarni
{"title":"Fine-Grained Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis Resilient Secure AES Core with Stacked Voltage Domains and Spatio-temporally Randomized Circuit Blocks","authors":"Meizhi Wang, Sirish Oruganti, Shanshan Xie, Raghavan Kumar, S. Mathew, J. Kulkarni","doi":"10.1109/ESSCIRC55480.2022.9911449","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this work, we demonstrate a novel unique design approach specifically targeting improved resilience against the fine-grained electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. Fine-grained EM SCA captures high SNR EM signature with tiny probes (1mm diameter) compared to coarse-grained EM (∼10mm diameter), making it more potent and leading to a higher threat. The EM-SCA critical circuit blocks are voltage-stacked to share a current loop, and a push-pull voltage regulator (VR) balances the mismatch current between the two stacked blocks. Dataflow and current loops are spatially and temporally randomized to obscure the EM side-channel signatures. Measurement results from a 128-bit Parallel Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core fabricated in 65nm CMOS shows MTD improvement of 1507X for fine-grained EM SCA. Coarse-grained EM and Power SCA MTDs also show an improvement of 122X and 657X respectively, which may be improved further by combining prior reported SCA resilient techniques.","PeriodicalId":168466,"journal":{"name":"ESSCIRC 2022- IEEE 48th European Solid State Circuits Conference (ESSCIRC)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ESSCIRC 2022- IEEE 48th European Solid State Circuits Conference (ESSCIRC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ESSCIRC55480.2022.9911449","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this work, we demonstrate a novel unique design approach specifically targeting improved resilience against the fine-grained electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. Fine-grained EM SCA captures high SNR EM signature with tiny probes (1mm diameter) compared to coarse-grained EM (∼10mm diameter), making it more potent and leading to a higher threat. The EM-SCA critical circuit blocks are voltage-stacked to share a current loop, and a push-pull voltage regulator (VR) balances the mismatch current between the two stacked blocks. Dataflow and current loops are spatially and temporally randomized to obscure the EM side-channel signatures. Measurement results from a 128-bit Parallel Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core fabricated in 65nm CMOS shows MTD improvement of 1507X for fine-grained EM SCA. Coarse-grained EM and Power SCA MTDs also show an improvement of 122X and 657X respectively, which may be improved further by combining prior reported SCA resilient techniques.