{"title":"ARCSG: Advancing Resilience of Cyber-Physical Smart Grid: An Integrated Co-Simulation Approach Incorporating Indicators of Compromise","authors":"Mohammed Asiri, N. Saxena, P. Burnap","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00047","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Modelling and simulation techniques offer cost-effective solutions for developing frameworks and modules that address the intertwined cyber-physical security challenges in the Smart Grid (SG) domain. While some existing co-simulation approaches consider both communication networks and power systems, they often overlook the importance of incorporating Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) in their analysis, which are crucial for detecting and mitigating cyber threats.In response to this gap, we introduce ARCSG, a co-simulation approach to study and enhance the resilience of complex cyber-physical power systems against cyber threats, with a particular focus on incorporating IOCs. Our design employs the Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) to emulate the cyber network and uses PowerWorld to model the power system processes. We incorporate control system components such as OpenPLC and ScadaBR. The co-simulation supports various protocols for monitoring and controlling the grid, such as Modbus, DNP3, ICCP, and PCCC. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our design by validating it through a false command attack on a PowerWorld case. Our approach aims to bolster the detection and mitigation of cyber threats by facilitating an advanced post-incident analysis. Such analysis empowers operators to rapidly identify the severity of a security violation, understand the strategies the adversary employed to initially breach security defences, and evaluate the comprehensive impact of the incident.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00047","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Modelling and simulation techniques offer cost-effective solutions for developing frameworks and modules that address the intertwined cyber-physical security challenges in the Smart Grid (SG) domain. While some existing co-simulation approaches consider both communication networks and power systems, they often overlook the importance of incorporating Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) in their analysis, which are crucial for detecting and mitigating cyber threats.In response to this gap, we introduce ARCSG, a co-simulation approach to study and enhance the resilience of complex cyber-physical power systems against cyber threats, with a particular focus on incorporating IOCs. Our design employs the Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) to emulate the cyber network and uses PowerWorld to model the power system processes. We incorporate control system components such as OpenPLC and ScadaBR. The co-simulation supports various protocols for monitoring and controlling the grid, such as Modbus, DNP3, ICCP, and PCCC. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our design by validating it through a false command attack on a PowerWorld case. Our approach aims to bolster the detection and mitigation of cyber threats by facilitating an advanced post-incident analysis. Such analysis empowers operators to rapidly identify the severity of a security violation, understand the strategies the adversary employed to initially breach security defences, and evaluate the comprehensive impact of the incident.
建模和仿真技术为开发框架和模块提供了具有成本效益的解决方案,以解决智能电网(SG)领域交织在一起的网络物理安全挑战。虽然一些现有的联合模拟方法同时考虑了通信网络和电力系统,但它们往往忽视了在分析中纳入危害指标(ioc)的重要性,而ioc对于检测和减轻网络威胁至关重要。为了弥补这一差距,我们引入了ARCSG,这是一种联合模拟方法,用于研究和增强复杂网络-物理电力系统对网络威胁的弹性,特别侧重于整合ioc。我们的设计采用通用开放研究仿真器(Common Open Research Emulator, CORE)对网络进行仿真,并使用PowerWorld对电力系统过程进行建模。我们结合了控制系统组件,如OpenPLC和ScadaBR。联合仿真支持Modbus、DNP3、ICCP、PCCC等多种网格监控协议。我们通过对PowerWorld案例的错误命令攻击来验证我们设计的有效性。我们的方法旨在通过促进高级事件后分析来加强对网络威胁的检测和缓解。这种分析使运营商能够快速识别安全违规的严重程度,了解攻击者最初破坏安全防御所采用的策略,并评估事件的综合影响。