IMPROVEMENT OF INCENTIVE STANDARDS FOR VOLUNTARY REFUSAL TO COMMIT A CORRUPTION OFFENSE BY AN EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Abstract

Modern realities are increasingly raising problems caused by the violation of anti-corruption legislation in the structure of internal affairs bodies (ATS), which are outside the criminal and administrative responsibility. The growing interest in the above-mentioned issues determines the relevance of the annotated topic. In this article, the perspective of the stimulating potential of the use of incentive incentives for voluntary refusal to commit a corruption offense by an employee of the Department of Internal Affairs is considered. When writing the article, empirical methods were used such as: survey, monitoring, study and generalization, retrospective and forecasting. The effectiveness of minimizing corruption offenses will be possible when enabling the operation of incentive incentives, acting as a special internal regulator and influencing tool that helps eliminate corrupt interest in the environment of police officers