Are Critical Audit Matters Informative?

Julia Klevak, J. Livnat, D. Pei, Kate Suslava
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Breaking from a long stretch of using largely standard language in unqualified audit opinions, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) expanded audit reports to disclose Critical Audit Matters (CAMs) and the audit procedures used to address them. The first wave of CAM disclosures began for large accelerated filers after June 2019, with most disclosures occurring in February 2020. Using Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques, this study examines the types of CAMs disclosed by auditors and the typical audit procedures used to address them. We then explore whether CAMs are informative to investors and security analysts. Our findings are consistent with greater amounts of CAM disclosures as indicators of greater uncertainty. We document that market reactions are more negative for firms with more CAM disclosures; analysts reduce their earnings forecasts to a larger extent for such firms; stock prices become more volatile; and the dispersion of analyst forecasts are greater for firms with more CAM disclosures. We further find that many issues related to CAMs are raised in earnings conference calls with analysts during the immediately subsequent quarter. While these findings indicate that CAMs are informative to investors and analysts, their effects are concentrated around the time of disclosure. We do not find evidence of a drift in returns after the initial disclosures.
关键审计事项是否具有信息性?
美国上市公司会计监督委员会(PCAOB)打破了长期以来在无保留审计意见中大量使用标准语言的做法,扩大了审计报告的范围,披露了关键审计事项(CAMs)和用于解决这些问题的审计程序。2019年6月之后,第一波针对大型加速申报者的CAM披露开始,大多数披露发生在2020年2月。利用自然语言处理(NLP)技术,本研究考察了审计师披露的CAMs类型以及用于解决这些CAMs的典型审计程序。然后,我们探讨CAMs是否对投资者和证券分析师提供信息。我们的发现与更多的CAM披露作为更大不确定性的指标是一致的。我们发现,披露更多CAM信息的公司的市场反应更为负面;分析师更大程度地降低了对这类公司的盈利预期;股票价格变得更加不稳定;对于CAM披露越多的公司,分析师预测的差异越大。我们进一步发现,许多与cam相关的问题在随后一个季度与分析师的收益电话会议上被提出。虽然这些发现表明,CAMs对投资者和分析师来说是有用的,但它们的影响主要集中在披露时间。我们没有发现在最初披露后回报出现漂移的证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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