The Influence of Non-Executive Director Control and Rewards on CEO Remuneration: Australian Evidence

Labor eJournal Pub Date : 2001-03-12 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.263050
R. Evans, John P. Evans
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

The study examined whether non-executive director (NED) control and remuneration impact on the CEO pay decision. NED control was represented by three measures. The first, the existence of a majority of non-executive directors on the board of directors; second, the instalment of a nomination committee to facilitate the employment of properly qualified, independent directors to the board; and third, participation of NEDs in the company?s operation as evidenced by attendance at regularly scheduled board meetings. This study finds no evidence that these variables have a significant impact upon the determination of CEO pay levels. The second aspect of the study explored the impact of NED remuneration (including an equity component) on the setting of CEO pay levels. It finds evidence that these variables have a significant influence upon the determination of CEO pay levels, with NED equity holdings apparently acting as restraint on CEO cash pay, and alternatively, NED pay (retainer) increasing in line with CEO cash pay.
非执行董事控制权和薪酬对CEO薪酬的影响:澳大利亚证据
本研究考察了非执行董事(NED)控制和薪酬对CEO薪酬决策的影响。NED控制由三个措施表示。第一,董事会中存在多数非执行董事;第二,设立一个提名委员会,以促进聘请适当合格的独立董事进入董事会;第三,NEDs在公司的参与?以出席定期召开的董事会会议为证。本研究没有发现证据表明这些变量对CEO薪酬水平的决定有显著影响。研究的第二个方面探讨了NED薪酬(包括股权部分)对CEO薪酬水平设定的影响。研究发现,这些变量对CEO薪酬水平的决定有显著的影响,NED股权持有对CEO现金薪酬具有明显的约束作用,NED薪酬(保留薪酬)随CEO现金薪酬的增加而增加。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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