Streit um die Menschenwürde

Abstract

Tue obligation to respect and protect human dignity plays an important role in current debates about medical ethics. But it does not always seem clear, which conclusions have to be drawn from this obligation. Therefore it is sometimes suggested, that the notion of human dignity is not clearly definable or that it is even an empty notion. This suspicion is agwavated by the assumption that any attempt to justify that norm fails by naturalistic fallacy. Tue article tries to show that the concept of human dignity has quite its own content. It argues that serious disputes over the interpretation of the norm of human dignity merely arise in limited areas of discussion and only for certain, explainable reasons. Tue reproach of naturalistic fallacy can also be rejected if it is possible to justify the norm of human dignity within the framework of transcendental philosophy (like discourse ethics). The obligation to respect and protect human dignity is neither unfounded nor empty; it contains no ready-made solutions for all ethical problems, however.