The Ban of Off-Net/On-Net Price Discrimination in Chile†

Claudio A. Agostini, M. Willington, Eduardo H. Saavedra
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Abstract

Chilean antitrust authorities banned termination-based price discrimination in mobile calls in 2012. This paper discusses the antitrust process that led to this prohibition and analyzes its merits. We characterize the discriminatory plans that the largest mobile company in Chile—Movistar—offered in 2010, when the legal dispute began, calibrate a competition model for the Chilean market—both for pre- and post-paid customers—and compare the observed price differentials with those which are justifiable on competitive grounds. The main result is that in most plans, efficiency and strategic reasons could explain the observed differential only for large call externality parameter values. We also discuss Competition Court rulings in the context of several other changes that affected the mobile telephony market in Chile and report the evolution of several key market indicators after the ban was introduced.
智利禁止网外/网内价格歧视
智利反垄断当局在2012年禁止了基于终端的移动电话价格歧视。本文讨论了导致这一禁令的反垄断过程,并分析了其优点。我们描述了智利最大的移动通信公司——movistar在2010年法律纠纷开始时提供的歧视性计划,为智利市场校准了一个竞争模型——既针对预付用户,也针对后付费用户——并将观察到的价格差异与在竞争基础上合理的价格差异进行了比较。主要结果是,在大多数计划中,效率和战略原因只能解释大呼叫外部性参数值所观察到的差异。我们还讨论了竞争法院在影响智利移动电话市场的其他几个变化的背景下的裁决,并报告了禁令引入后几个关键市场指标的演变。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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