A Deep Game Bidding Model and Practice of Electricity Market

Maolin Zhang, Songbo Huang, Shuangquan Liu, Ruichen Wang, Xiangrui Liu, N. Zhou, Gaoquan Ma, Y. Xing, Cong Chen
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Abstract

Aiming at the problems such as unclear price signals and insufficient competition in the current power market, a deep game bidding model for supply and demand sides is proposed based on the listing trading mechanism. Supply and demand sides both list and delist within the limits of price through three stages including information publicity, power plants listing and power consumers delisting, power consumers listing and power plants delisting, then electricity prices are cleared according to the delisting price. The accumulated delisting capacity limit is unconstrained. By optimizing the order of transactions in the two trading phases, the publicity volume of market participants is taken as the upper limit of the transaction volume of the entire two-way listing transaction. Flow charts of the transaction organization and the market clearing calculation method are also given. Not only can the bidding model stimulate the reasonable offer of both supply and demand, but also it can realize the organic cooperation of trading price and amount, reduce trading risk, expand trading power and improve the efficiency of resource allocation. The operation of the Yunnan electricity market has confirmed the rationality, effectiveness and practicability of the bidding model.
电力市场深层博弈竞价模型及实践
针对当前电力市场价格信号不清晰、竞争不充分等问题,提出了一种基于上市交易机制的供需双方深度博弈竞价模型。供需双方通过信息公示、电厂上市与电力消费者退市、电力消费者上市与电力企业退市三个阶段,在价格限定范围内上市与退市,然后按照退市价格清盘电价。累计退市能力限制不受约束。通过优化两个交易阶段的交易顺序,将市场参与者的公示量作为整个双向上市交易交易量的上限。给出了交易组织流程图和市场出清计算方法。竞价模式不仅可以刺激供需双方的合理报价,而且可以实现交易价格与交易金额的有机合作,降低交易风险,扩大交易力量,提高资源配置效率。云南电力市场的运行验证了该竞价模式的合理性、有效性和实用性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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