Denying a Unified Concept of Disability.

IF 1.3 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-21 DOI:10.1093/jmp/jhac021

Kevin Timpe

引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper argues that there are reasons to believe that there is no single concept or category which demarcates all individuals who have a disability from those individuals who do not. The paper begins by describing that I call 'a Unified Concept View of Disability' and the role that such a view plays in debates about the nature of disability. After considering reasons to think that our concept of disability is not unified in the way that the Unified Concept View assumes, I outline what a non-unified approach to disability might look like. The paper concludes by considering implications of rejecting the Unified Concept View of disability.

查看原文本刊更多论文

否认残疾的统一概念。

本文认为，有理由相信，没有一个单一的概念或类别来区分所有残疾的人与那些没有残疾的人。这篇论文首先描述了我称之为"残疾的统一概念观点"以及这种观点在关于残疾本质的辩论中所起的作用。在考虑了我们对残疾的概念并不像统一概念视图所假设的那样统一的原因之后，我概述了对残疾的非统一方法可能是什么样子的。最后，本文讨论了拒绝残疾统一概念观的意义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

2.90

自引率

6.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.