Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

IF 2 3区 心理学 Q3 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Claire Delnatte , Emmanuel Roze , Pierre Pouget , Cécile Galléa , Quentin Welniarz
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention.

We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

神经科学能启发关于自由意志的哲学辩论吗?
多年来,自由意志一直是哲学和科学讨论的核心。然而,神经科学的最新进展被认为是对自由意志这一常识的威胁,因为它们挑战了行动自由的两个核心要求。第一种是决定论和自由意志的概念,即决定和行动不能完全由先前的原因决定。第二个是心理因果关系的概念,即我们的心理状态在物理世界中必须具有因果效应,换句话说,行为是由意识意图引起的。我们提出了与决定论和心理因果关系有关的经典哲学立场,并讨论了神经科学如何根据最近的实验发现为哲学辩论提供新的视角。总的来说,我们得出的结论是,目前的证据不足以破坏自由意志。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Neuropsychologia
Neuropsychologia 医学-行为科学
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
3.80%
发文量
228
审稿时长
4 months
期刊介绍: Neuropsychologia is an international interdisciplinary journal devoted to experimental and theoretical contributions that advance understanding of human cognition and behavior from a neuroscience perspective. The journal will consider for publication studies that link brain function with cognitive processes, including attention and awareness, action and motor control, executive functions and cognitive control, memory, language, and emotion and social cognition.
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