Discovering cooperation: Endogenous change in international organizations.

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2022-12-14 DOI:10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0

Tobias Lenz, Besir Ceka, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Alexandr Burilkov

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Abstract

Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO's founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifies as an IO's policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifications, we find robust support for our argument.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0.

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发现合作：国际组织的内生变化。

为什么有些国际组织的授权会随着时间的推移而不断增加，而另一些国际组织的授权却保持不变或不断减少？我们假设，授权的动态变化是由国际组织的创始契约决定的。植根于开放式契约的国际组织有能力随着时间的推移发现合作：随着新问题的出现，这些国际组织可以采取新的政策或加强现有领域的合作。这反过来又会引发授权需求。然而，这一逻辑受到国际组织政治体制的制约。在民主占主导地位的国际组织中，授权受到政治化的制约，而政治化又会随着国际组织政策组合的扩大而加剧。我们使用更新版的 "国际权力衡量 "数据集（Measure of International Authority）对上述观点进行了检验，该数据集涵盖了1950年至2019年期间的41个地区性国际组织。在控制了其他解释并解决了一系列模型规格中潜在的内生性问题后，我们发现我们的论点得到了有力的支持：在线版本包含补充材料，可查阅 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The review of international organizations

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