Threshold violations in social judgment.

IF 6.4 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL
Nadav Klein, Ed O'Brien
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

People commonly establish in advance the thresholds they use to pass social judgment (e.g., promising reward/punishment after a fixed number of good/bad behaviors). Ten preregistered experiments (N = 5,542) reveal when, why, and how people violate their social judgment thresholds, even after formally establishing them based on having full information about what might unfold. People can be swayed to be both "quicker to judge" (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then acting after 2 such behaviors) and "slower to judge" (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then withholding until 4 such behaviors)-despite all behaviors obeying their threshold. We document these discrepancies across many parameters. We also propose and test an integrative theoretical framework to explain them, rooted in psychological support: Being both "quicker" and "slower" to judge reflect a shared function of the distinct modes of evaluation involved in the act of setting social judgment thresholds (involving a packed summary judgment extending across myriad possible realities) versus following them in real time (involving an unpacked focus on whatever specific reality unfolds, which could provide higher or lower support than threshold setters had accounted for). Manipulating the degree of psychological support thus determines the direction of threshold violations: Higher support produces "quicker to judge" effects while lower support produces "slower to judge" effects. Finally, although violating one's preset threshold may sometimes be to one's benefit, we document initial evidence that it also risks damaging people's reputations and relationships. When it comes to treating others, making exceptions to the rule may often be the rule-for better or worse. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

社会判断阈值违规。
人们通常会提前设定他们用来进行社会判断的阈值(例如,在一定数量的好/坏行为后承诺奖励/惩罚)。10个预先注册的实验(N = 5542)揭示了人们何时、为何以及如何违反他们的社会判断阈值,即使是在有了关于可能发生的事情的全部信息的基础上正式建立了这些阈值。人们可能会被“快速判断”(例如,在3个好/坏行为后承诺奖励/惩罚,但在2个这样的行为后采取行动)和“慢速判断”(例如,在3个好/坏行为后承诺奖励/惩罚,但直到4个这样的行为后才采取行动)——尽管所有行为都符合他们的阈值。我们记录了许多参数之间的差异。我们还提出并测试了一个基于心理支持的综合理论框架来解释它们:“更快”和“更慢”的判断反映了不同评估模式的共同功能,这些模式涉及设置社会判断阈值(涉及跨越无数可能现实的打包简易判断)与实时跟踪它们(涉及对任何具体现实展开的非打包关注,这可能提供比阈值设置者所考虑的更高或更低的支持)。因此,操纵心理支持的程度决定了阈值违反的方向:高支持产生“更快判断”的效果,而低支持产生“更慢判断”的效果。最后,尽管违反预设的阈值有时可能对自己有利,但我们记录的初步证据表明,它也有可能损害人们的声誉和关系。当涉及到对待他人时,破例往往是一种规则——不管是好是坏。(PsycInfo数据库记录(c) 2023 APA,版权所有)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
3.90%
发文量
250
期刊介绍: Journal of personality and social psychology publishes original papers in all areas of personality and social psychology and emphasizes empirical reports, but may include specialized theoretical, methodological, and review papers.Journal of personality and social psychology is divided into three independently edited sections. Attitudes and Social Cognition addresses all aspects of psychology (e.g., attitudes, cognition, emotion, motivation) that take place in significant micro- and macrolevel social contexts.
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