认知不公正在晚期痴呆:非语言证明不公正的情况下。

IF 1.4 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Lucienne Spencer
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引用次数: 4

摘要

迄今为止,关于认知不公正的文献将证言不公正的概念局限于诸如询问、讨论、审议,以及最重要的,讲述等言语表达。我建议,现在是扩大证言不公正的范围,包括更广泛的表达的时候了。有争议的是,我心目中的交流形式是非语言表达。非语言表达是一种至关重要的交流方式,尽管经常被忽视,尤其是对患有某些神经认知障碍的人来说。依赖非语言表达是某些形式的神经认知障碍(如“智力残疾”、自闭症和晚期痴呆)的共同特征。根据目前文献中倡导的证词不公正的狭义定义,非语言表达的人免于证词不公正。然而,当我们考虑来自非语言人士的有意义的沟通由于身份偏见而被驳回或忽视的情况时,似乎存在明显的证词伤害。以晚期痴呆症为例,我认为证词不公正的定义应该扩大到包括所有的交流实践,无论是口头的还是非口头的,以涵盖对我们社会中一些最边缘化的人造成的认知伤害。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Epistemic Injustice in Late-Stage Dementia: A Case for Non-Verbal Testimonial Injustice.

The literature on epistemic injustice has thus far confined the concept of testimonial injustice to speech expressions such as inquiring, discussing, deliberating, and, above all, telling. I propose that it is time to broaden the horizons of testimonial injustice to include a wider range of expressions. Controversially, the form of communication I have in mind is non-verbal expression. Non-verbal expression is a vital, though often overlooked, form of communication, particularly for people who have certain neurocognitive disorders. Dependency upon non-verbal expression is a common feature of some forms of neurocognitive disorders such as 'intellectual disabilities', autism and late-stage dementia. According to the narrow definition of testimonial injustice currently championed in the literature, people who express non-verbally are exempt from testimonial injustice. However, when we consider cases where meaningful communications from non-verbal people are dismissed or ignored in virtue of identity prejudice, there seems to be a distinct testimonial harm at play. Using late-stage dementia as a case study, I argue that the definition of testimonial injustice should be expanded to include all communicative practices, whether verbal or non-verbal, to encompass the epistemic harms inflicted upon some of the most marginalised in our society.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
17.60%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: Social Epistemology provides a forum for philosophical and social scientific enquiry that incorporates the work of scholars from a variety of disciplines who share a concern with the production, assessment and validation of knowledge. The journal covers both empirical research into the origination and transmission of knowledge and normative considerations which arise as such research is implemented, serving as a guide for directing contemporary knowledge enterprises. Social Epistemology publishes "exchanges" which are the collective product of several contributors and take the form of critical syntheses, open peer commentaries interviews, applications, provocations, reviews and responses
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