PSSM

In this paper, we investigate the secure memory architecture for GPUs and point out that conventional CPU secure memory architecture can not be directly adopted to the GPUs. The key reasons include: (1) accessing the security metadata, including encryption counters, message authentication codes (MACs) and integrity trees, requires significant memory bandwidth, which may lead to severe bandwidth competition with normal data accesses and degrade the GPU performance; (2) contemporary GPUs use partitioned memory organization, which results in storage and coherence problems for encryption counters and integrity trees since different partitions may need to update the same counter/integrity tree blocks; and (3) the existing split-counter block organization is not friendly to sectored caches, which are commonly used in GPU for bandwidth savings. Based on these observations, we propose partitioned and sectored security metadata (PSSM), which has two components: (a) using the offset addresses (referred to as local addresses) within each partition, instead of the virtual or physical addresses, to generate the metadata so as to solve the counter or integrity tree storage and coherence problem and (b) reorganizing the security metadata to make them friendly to the sectored cache structure so as to reduce the memory bandwidth consumption of metadata accesses. With these proposed schemes, the performance overhead of secure GPU memory is reduced from 59.22% to 16.84% on average. If only memory encryption is required, the performance overhead is reduced from 29.53% to 5.18%.