{"title":"N × 2潜在游戏中的平滑虚拟玩法","authors":"Brian Swenson, H. Poor","doi":"10.1109/IEEECONF44664.2019.9048995","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all N × 2 (N-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made arbitrarily small by taking the smoothing parameter to zero. Simple proof techniques are furnished by considering regular potential games.","PeriodicalId":6684,"journal":{"name":"2019 53rd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers","volume":"124 3","pages":"1739-1743"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Smooth Fictitious Play in N × 2 Potential Games\",\"authors\":\"Brian Swenson, H. Poor\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/IEEECONF44664.2019.9048995\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all N × 2 (N-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made arbitrarily small by taking the smoothing parameter to zero. Simple proof techniques are furnished by considering regular potential games.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6684,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 53rd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers\",\"volume\":\"124 3\",\"pages\":\"1739-1743\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 53rd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEECONF44664.2019.9048995\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 53rd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEECONF44664.2019.9048995","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all N × 2 (N-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made arbitrarily small by taking the smoothing parameter to zero. Simple proof techniques are furnished by considering regular potential games.
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