Copker:没有RAM的私钥计算

Le Guan, Jingqiang Lin, Bo Luo, Jiwu Jing
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引用次数: 53

摘要

密码系统对计算机和通信安全至关重要,例如,RSA用于PGP电子邮件客户端,AES用于全磁盘加密。在实践中,加密密钥以明文形式加载并存储在RAM中,因此容易受到物理内存攻击(例如,冷启动攻击)。为了解决这个问题,我们提出了Copker,它完全在CPU内实现非对称密码系统,而不将明文私钥存储在RAM中。在主动模式下,Copker仅在片上CPU缓存(和寄存器)中存储数千字节的敏感数据,包括私钥和中间状态。执行解密/签名操作时,不会将敏感信息存储在系统内存中。在挂起模式下,Copker将对称加密的私钥存储在内存中,同时采用现有的解决方案将密钥加密密钥安全地保存在CPU寄存器中。因此,Copker以挂起模式释放系统资源。本文在多私钥的支持下,利用最常用的非对称密码系统RSA实现了Copker。我们展示了Copker提供的解密/签名服务对物理内存攻击是安全的。同时,通过大量的实验,我们证明了我们的Copker实现是安全的,并且需要合理的开销。Keywords-Cache-as-RAM;冷启动攻击;密钥管理;非对称加密实现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Copker: Computing with Private Keys without RAM
Cryptographic systems are essential for computer and communication security, for instance, RSA is used in PGP Email clients and AES is employed in full disk encryption. In practice, the cryptographic keys are loaded and stored in RAM as plain-text, and therefore vulnerable to physical memory attacks (e.g., cold-boot attacks). To tackle this problem, we propose Copker, which implements asymmetric cryptosystems entirely within the CPU, without storing plain-text private keys in the RAM. In its active mode, Copker stores kilobytes of sensitive data, including the private key and the intermediate states, only in onchip CPU caches (and registers). Decryption/signing operations are performed without storing sensitive information in system memory. In the suspend mode, Copker stores symmetrically encrypted private keys in memory, while employs existing solutions to keep the key-encryption key securely in CPU registers. Hence, Copker releases the system resources in the suspend mode. In this paper, we implement Copker with the most common asymmetric cryptosystem, RSA, with the support of multiple private keys. We show that Copker provides decryption/signing services that are secure against physical memory attacks. Meanwhile, with intensive experiments, we demonstrate that our implementation of Copker is secure and requires reasonable overhead. Keywords—Cache-as-RAM; cold-boot attack; key management; asymmetric cryptography implementation.
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