古代的怀疑态度和分歧

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Marcelo D. Boeri, Leandro de Brasi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

有人认为,哲学上的“怀疑态度”,最初是在苏格拉底的方法中发现的,可以说是在皮罗尼主义者对分歧的处理中发现的,应该被认为是一种认识论上的积极态度,因为它促进了对被认为是真实的东西的严肃哲学检查,而不需要经常与之相关的激进怀疑主义。我们认为,如果一个分歧的双方是相等的(在那一刻,鉴于现有的证据),它不需要一个人认为分歧是不可判定的,没有资格,因此无限期地暂停判断。如果是这样的话,我们主张,皮洛尼亚式的基于分歧的立场作为怀疑主义的一种形式将受到极大的限制,而应该被视为促进一种认识论上有利的怀疑态度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
THE ANCIENT SCEPTIC ATTITUDE AND DISAGREEMENT
ABSTRACT It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
审稿时长
28 weeks
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