超越存在核心的真贬义句:论霍姆和梅理论的一些不受欢迎的含义*

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Ludovic Soutif, André Nascimento Pontes
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文探讨了对贬义词作为词汇项的意义进行解释的最重要和最有争议的尝试之一,即Hom和May的尝试。在概述了这一理论之后,我们指出了几组贬义的句子,这些句子由于它们的原因而成为事实,而它们是否与它们所倡导的观点(所谓的道德和语义清白)相一致的问题仍然存在。帮助我们自己找到标准模型-理论框架,即Hom和May(大概)工作的框架,我们证明它们与观点是相容的。鉴于贬义词的道德重要性和它们的话语的实际影响的问题都没有被证明解决,我们然后强调了一些被审查的贬义词句子的不受欢迎的道德和实用意义,从而表明,广泛理解的观点,在道德和语义上并不像它应该的那样无害。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
TRUE PEJORATIVE SENTENCES BEYOND THE EXISTENTIAL CORE: ON SOME UNWELCOME IMPLICATIONS OF HOM AND MAY’S THEORY*
ABSTRACT This paper considers one of the most significant and controversial attempts to account for the meaning of pejoratives as lexical items, namely Hom and May’s. After outlining the theory, we pinpoint sets of pejorative sentences that come out true on their account and for which the question as to whether they are compatible with the view advocated by them (so-called Moral and Semantic Innocence) remains open. Helping ourselves to the standard model-theoretical framework Hom and May (presumably) work in, we prove they are compatible with the view. Given that the issues of both the moral import of pejoratives and the practical effects of their utterance are not settled by the proof, we then highlight unwelcome moral and pragmatic implications for some of the pejorative sentences under scrutiny, thereby showing that the view, broadly understood, is not as morally and semantically innocuous as it is meant to be.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
审稿时长
28 weeks
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