垂直差异化、成本结构与合谋稳定性分析

Huishuang He
{"title":"垂直差异化、成本结构与合谋稳定性分析","authors":"Huishuang He","doi":"10.3968/6199","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In order to analyze collusion stability in real economy under different cost structure, the fixed cost structure and variable cost structure is assumed under vertical differentiation and different competitive types (Cournot competition and Bertrand competition). By comparing the different competitive equilibrium, firm competes with each other under different cost structure and competitive types, which influences the stability of collusion in different ways. Under fixed cost and changeable cost structure, the high-quality firm is always more difficult to maintain collusion than the low-quality firm in vertical differentiation. With the increase of, the quality difference will get smaller and smaller, the high-quality becomes more and more difficult to maintain collusion. In equilibrium, price competition is fiercer, firms aim to release price competition under Bertrand competition, and so the quality difference will be bigger.","PeriodicalId":7348,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Natural Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Analysis About Vertical Differentiation, Cost Structure and the Stability of Collusion\",\"authors\":\"Huishuang He\",\"doi\":\"10.3968/6199\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In order to analyze collusion stability in real economy under different cost structure, the fixed cost structure and variable cost structure is assumed under vertical differentiation and different competitive types (Cournot competition and Bertrand competition). By comparing the different competitive equilibrium, firm competes with each other under different cost structure and competitive types, which influences the stability of collusion in different ways. Under fixed cost and changeable cost structure, the high-quality firm is always more difficult to maintain collusion than the low-quality firm in vertical differentiation. With the increase of, the quality difference will get smaller and smaller, the high-quality becomes more and more difficult to maintain collusion. In equilibrium, price competition is fiercer, firms aim to release price competition under Bertrand competition, and so the quality difference will be bigger.\",\"PeriodicalId\":7348,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Advances in Natural Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-12-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Advances in Natural Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3968/6199\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Advances in Natural Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3968/6199","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

为了分析不同成本结构下实体经济的合谋稳定性,分别假设垂直差异化和不同竞争类型(古诺竞争和贝特朗竞争)下的固定成本结构和可变成本结构。通过比较不同的竞争均衡,企业之间在不同的成本结构和竞争类型下进行竞争,从而以不同的方式影响合谋的稳定性。在固定成本和可变成本结构下,高质量企业在纵向差异化中往往比低质量企业更难以维持合谋。随着产量的增加,质量差异会越来越小,高质量串通越来越难以维持。在均衡状态下,价格竞争更激烈,在伯特兰竞争下,企业的目标是释放价格竞争,因此质量差异会更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Analysis About Vertical Differentiation, Cost Structure and the Stability of Collusion
In order to analyze collusion stability in real economy under different cost structure, the fixed cost structure and variable cost structure is assumed under vertical differentiation and different competitive types (Cournot competition and Bertrand competition). By comparing the different competitive equilibrium, firm competes with each other under different cost structure and competitive types, which influences the stability of collusion in different ways. Under fixed cost and changeable cost structure, the high-quality firm is always more difficult to maintain collusion than the low-quality firm in vertical differentiation. With the increase of, the quality difference will get smaller and smaller, the high-quality becomes more and more difficult to maintain collusion. In equilibrium, price competition is fiercer, firms aim to release price competition under Bertrand competition, and so the quality difference will be bigger.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信