风险分类和健康保险

IF 0.4 Q3 LAW
G. Dionne, Casey G. Rothschild
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引用次数: 3

摘要

风险分类是指保险公司利用可观察到的特征,对具有相似预期索赔的个体进行分组,计算相应的保费,从而减少信息不对称。通过完善的风险分类,保费充分反映了与每一类风险特征相关的预期成本,并产生有效的结果。在卫生部门,风险分类也受到对社会公平和潜在歧视的关切。我们提出了一个分析框架,说明了有效的保险提供和社会公平之间的潜在权衡。我们还回顾了关于风险分类和剩余不对称信息的实证研究,这些信息为这种权衡提供了信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Risk Classification and Health Insurance
Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. With perfect risk classification, premiums fully reflect the expected cost associated with each class of risk characteristics and yield efficient outcomes. In the health sector, risk classification is also subject to concerns about social equity and potential discrimination. We present an analytical framework that illustrates the potential trade-off between efficient insurance provision and social equity. We also review empirical studies on risk classification and residual asymmetric information that inform this trade-off.
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