笛卡尔在自然主义的极限

Q4 Arts and Humanities
Denis Kambouchner
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了理解笛卡尔关于人的理论与自然主义纲领之间的差距,有必要问一下笛卡尔所说的“灵魂推动身体的力量”究竟是什么意思。对笛卡尔文本,尤其是《人论》和《灵魂的激情》的精确研究,将导致灵魂对身体的任何直接作用被排除在外。灵魂的一切活动都是通过在头脑中形成某些意象而进行的,这些意象决定了动物精神的某些流动,至于激情,这种活动的有效性主要是一种习惯。思想的自发性并不排除将“灵魂的力量”与“大脑的倾向”联系起来的可能性。相反,笛卡尔文本中没有任何东西允许我们消除我们所经历的这种自发性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Descartes aux limites du naturalisme
In order to appreciate the distance between the Cartesian theory of man and a naturalistic programme, it is necessary to ask what exactly Descartes means by “the soul’s power to move the body”. A precise examination of the Cartesian texts, especially the Treatise on Man and The Passions of the Soul, will lead to the exclusion of any direct action of the soul on the body. All the action of the soul goes through the formation of certain images in the brain, which determine certain flows of animal spirits, and as for the passions, the effectiveness of this action is mainly a matter of habit. The spontaneity of thought does not preclude considering the ‘force of the soul’ as associated with the ‘disposition of the brain’. Conversely, nothing in the Cartesian texts allows us to eliminate this spontaneity where we experience it.
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来源期刊
Argumenta Philosophica
Argumenta Philosophica Arts and Humanities-Visual Arts and Performing Arts
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