可转让市场专有权扩展促进抗生素发展:一项经济分析。

B. Rome, A. Kesselheim
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引用次数: 11

摘要

背景:为了应对多药耐药生物日益增长的威胁,政策制定者正在寻求促进新型抗生素开发的想法。2018年,国会提出了《改造法案》(REVAMP Act),以可转让的市场排他性代金券奖励某些新型抗生素的制造商。方法:我们通过识别2007年至2016年FDA批准的可能有资格获得排他性凭证的抗菌药物,并将每种药物与抗生素批准后4年内面临仿制药准入的收入最高的快速通道药物相匹配,来估计该提案的经济影响。假设仿制药进入市场后支出减少75%,我们计算了这些可转让市场独占性延长的每一种药物和总社会成本。结果:我们确定了10种有资格获得独家代金券的抗菌素,每种抗菌素都与2019年7月之前面临仿制药申请的17种快速通道药物中的一种相匹配。这10种药物在进入仿制药前的年收入中位数为2.49亿美元(范围:2600万美元至27亿美元)。考虑到仿制药进入后75%的支出减少,与12个月延长排他性相关的额外支出中位数为1.87亿美元,10年内总计为45亿美元。虽然延长市场独占权是鼓励新型抗生素开发的一种具有政治吸引力的机制,但这种方法将在未来十年花费公共和私人支付款人数十亿美元。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Transferrable Market Exclusivity Extensions to Promote Antibiotic Development: An Economic Analysis.
BACKGROUND To address the growing threat of multidrug resistant organisms, policymakers are seeking ideas to promote development of novel antibiotics. In 2018, the REVAMP Act was proposed in Congress to reward manufacturers of certain novel antibiotics with transferrable market exclusivity vouchers. METHODS We estimated the economic impact of this proposal by identifying antimicrobial drugs approved by the FDA from 2007 - 2016 that would likely have qualified for an exclusivity voucher and matching each drug to the highest-revenue fast-track drug facing generic entry within 4 years after the antibiotic was approved. Assuming a spending decrease of 75% after generic entry, we calculated the per-drug and total societal costs of these transferrable market exclusivity extensions over a decade. RESULTS We identified 10 antimicrobials that would have qualified for an exclusivity voucher, each of which was matched with one of 17 fast-track drugs facing generic entry through July 2019. These 10 drugs had a median annual revenue prior to generic entry of $249 million (range: $26 million - $2.7 billion). Accounting for a 75% spending reduction after generic entry, the median excess spending associated with 12 months of extended exclusivity was $187 million, for a total of $4.5 billion over 10 years. CONCLUSIONS While market exclusivity extensions are a politically appealing mechanism to encourage novel antibiotic development, this approach would cost public and private payers billions of dollars over the next decade.
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