利用光子发射显微镜从fpga直接读取空闲块RAM

Jacob Couch, Nicole Whewell, A. Monica, S. Papadakis
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在许多逆向工程中,侧通道被用来从集成电路中提取设计信息和数据。在本文中,演示了一种技术,通过直接读取FPGA内的空闲SRAM单元来恢复数据,而无需使用读取电路。这是通过使用光子发射显微镜来捕获泄漏电流从SRAM单元内的NMOS晶体管的源极流向漏极时发射的光子来实现的。根据在特定单元中存储的是0还是1状态,发射晶体管的位置是不同的。许多集成电路中的读电路不能轻易地以可重复的模式激活,从而形成需要访问空闲SRAM单元的内容。在220纳米工艺节点FPGA上对其进行了评估和改进。我们讨论了这些器件中光子发射的物理性质以及对SRAM内容成功成像的影响。通过初步的调查和计算,我们预测从空闲SRAM中提取数据可以在更现代的零件上进行。通过对该技术的扩展,可以从集成电路中提取加密密钥、状态信息和限制变量等数据,这些数据是传统的比特流和固件逆向工程无法访问的。然后可以利用这些信息来确保系统的完整性,或者作为对系统完整性的威胁。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Direct read of idle block RAM from FPGAs utilizing photon emission microscopy
In many reverse engineering efforts, side channels have been utilized to extract both design information and data from integrated circuits. In this paper, a technique is demonstrated to recover data by directly reading idle SRAM cells within an FPGA, without engaging the read circuitry. This is accomplished using photon emission microscopy to capture the photons that are emitted as leakage currents flow from the source to the drain of NMOS transistors within the SRAM cell. Depending on whether a 0 or 1 state is stored in a particular cell, the location of the emitting transistor is different. The read circuity in many integrated circuits cannot be easily activated in a repeatable pattern, thus forming need to access the contents of idle SRAM cells. This was evaluated and refined on a 220 nm process node FPGA. We discuss the physics of photon emission in these devices and the consequences for successful imaging of SRAM contents. Through initial investigations and calculations, we predict that extraction of data from idle SRAM can be conducted on more modern parts. Through an extension of this technique, data such as encryption keys, state information, and restricted variables that would not be accessible through traditional bitstream and firmware reverse engineering efforts can be extracted from the integrated circuit. This information can then be utilized to ensure the integrity of a system, or as a threat to the integrity of the system.
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