{"title":"自动黑盒检测访问控制漏洞在web应用程序","authors":"Xiaowei Li, X. Si, Yuan Xue","doi":"10.1145/2557547.2557552","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Access control vulnerabilities within web applications pose serious security threats to the sensitive information stored at back-end databases. Existing approaches are limited from several aspects, including the coarse granularity at which the access control is modeled, the incapability of handling complex relationship between data entities and the requirement of source code and the specific application platform. In this paper, we present an automated black-box technique for identifying a broad range of access control vulnerabilities, which can be applied to applications that are developed using different languages and platforms. We model the access control policy based on a novel virtual SQL query concept, which captures both the database access operations (i.e., through SQL queries) and the post-processing filters within the web application. We leverage a crawler to automatically explore the application and collect execution traces. From the traces, we identify the set of database access operations that are allowed for each role (i.e., role-level policy inference) and extract the constraints over the operation parameters to characterize the relationship between the users and the accessed data (i.e., user-level policy inference). Based on the inferred policy, we construct test inputs to exploit the application for potential access control flaws. We implement a prototype system BATMAN and evaluate it over a set of PHP and JSP web applications. The experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness and accuracy of our approach.","PeriodicalId":90472,"journal":{"name":"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy","volume":"9 1","pages":"49-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Automated black-box detection of access control vulnerabilities in web applications\",\"authors\":\"Xiaowei Li, X. Si, Yuan Xue\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2557547.2557552\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Access control vulnerabilities within web applications pose serious security threats to the sensitive information stored at back-end databases. Existing approaches are limited from several aspects, including the coarse granularity at which the access control is modeled, the incapability of handling complex relationship between data entities and the requirement of source code and the specific application platform. In this paper, we present an automated black-box technique for identifying a broad range of access control vulnerabilities, which can be applied to applications that are developed using different languages and platforms. We model the access control policy based on a novel virtual SQL query concept, which captures both the database access operations (i.e., through SQL queries) and the post-processing filters within the web application. We leverage a crawler to automatically explore the application and collect execution traces. From the traces, we identify the set of database access operations that are allowed for each role (i.e., role-level policy inference) and extract the constraints over the operation parameters to characterize the relationship between the users and the accessed data (i.e., user-level policy inference). Based on the inferred policy, we construct test inputs to exploit the application for potential access control flaws. We implement a prototype system BATMAN and evaluate it over a set of PHP and JSP web applications. The experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness and accuracy of our approach.\",\"PeriodicalId\":90472,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"49-60\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-03-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. 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Automated black-box detection of access control vulnerabilities in web applications
Access control vulnerabilities within web applications pose serious security threats to the sensitive information stored at back-end databases. Existing approaches are limited from several aspects, including the coarse granularity at which the access control is modeled, the incapability of handling complex relationship between data entities and the requirement of source code and the specific application platform. In this paper, we present an automated black-box technique for identifying a broad range of access control vulnerabilities, which can be applied to applications that are developed using different languages and platforms. We model the access control policy based on a novel virtual SQL query concept, which captures both the database access operations (i.e., through SQL queries) and the post-processing filters within the web application. We leverage a crawler to automatically explore the application and collect execution traces. From the traces, we identify the set of database access operations that are allowed for each role (i.e., role-level policy inference) and extract the constraints over the operation parameters to characterize the relationship between the users and the accessed data (i.e., user-level policy inference). Based on the inferred policy, we construct test inputs to exploit the application for potential access control flaws. We implement a prototype system BATMAN and evaluate it over a set of PHP and JSP web applications. The experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness and accuracy of our approach.